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Abstract. Chameleon signatures were introduced by Krawczyk and Rabin to provide a non-transferable signature scheme. However, the nontransferability property requires the willingness of the recipient in consequentially exposing a secret key and therefore invalidating all signatures
issued to the same recipient’s public key. This notion has been extended
by Chen et al. to allow a “key-exposure” freeness scheme. However, it
was concluded that to achieve this key-exposure freeness, one would require a technique called “identity customization”. Therefore, the notion
of identity-based chameleon hash function becomes redundant since the
identity is always needed in the construction of chameleon hash functions themselves. In this paper, in contrast to the previous construction,
we construct an identity-based chameleon hash without key exposure
without requiring any identity customization. More importantly, using
the framework proposed by Susilo and Mu, we extended our scheme
to mitigate phishing. Furthermore, our scheme can be easily extended
to multi-party scenario, where a phishing scenario can be mitigate in a
mailing list scenario, which is more practical.
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Introduction

E-mail has been around since the inception of the Internet. It was the most
popular application when the Internet was in its infancy, and it has become more
and more elaborate and powerful over the years, and it continues to evolve. As is
ordinary postal mail, e-mail is an asynchronous communication medium, where
people send and read messages when it is convenient for them, without having
to coordinate with other people’s schedule. Additionally, e-mail is repudiable.
Any email directed to anyone cannot be used as a convincing argument in the
court that a sender has indeed sent her message. This is due to the ability of
the receiver to create the e-mail himself. The problem becomes harder when we
would like to have our email authenticated. Signing methods, such as PGP, will
eliminate the repudiability of e-mails.
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Phishing is a form of online identity theft that has been a growing problem
to Internet users. The most common form of phishing is delivered via spoofed
e-mail. Therefore, it becomes an essential issue on how to authenticate e-mails to
ensure their authenticity. E-mail phishing attacks aim to gain recipient’s personal
information, such as online banking account numbers, password and credit card
numbers, which allow the adversary to steal money electronically from these
accounts or transfer money between accounts in order to obscure the actual flow
of transactions. E-mail phishing attacks usually start with an official-looking
email that leads recipient to a spoofed website. At this point, passive or active
attacks may be launched. In a passive attack, a recipient is tricked to enter
personal information which is relayed to the malicious attacker. In the latter
type of attack, adversary may launch a man-in-the-middle attack, which relays
communications between the legitimate site and customer.
In [8], a novel framework to authenticate e-mails without losing the repudiability property was proposed. The idea of the framework incorporates the
notion of chameleon hash function [7] to enable the repudiability property. Unfortunately, as noted in [6], the chameleon hash functions are normally equipped
with the key exposure problem, namely the willingness of the recipient in consequentially exposing a secret key is required to deny the validity of the signatures,
and therefore, this notion is impractical. Due to this problem, Chen et al. proposed the notion of chameleon hash functions without key exposure in [6]. This
notion was further evaluated and extended in [2], and it was concluded that a
technique called identity customization is needed to construct chameleon hash
functions without key exposure. Therefore, it is quite redundant to construct
an identity-based chameleon hash function, since some forms of “identity” has
been used in a regular chameleon hash function to eliminate the key exposure
problem.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we specifically provide the following contributions.
– New Approach for Constructing ID-based chameleon hash functions. In contrast to [2], for the first time in the literature, we propose a new identitybased chameleon hash functions without requiring the identity customization
technique as suggested in [2, 6]. Using our technique, one can derive a “regular” chameleon hash function which is more natural, ie. the hash functions
do not require any identity of the recipients involved (cf. [2, 6]).
– Applications for Mitigating Phishing. Using the framework developed in [8],
one can derive an efficient phishing mitigation technique by incorporating
our ID-based chameleon hash function.
– Applications for Mitigating Phishing in Mailing List. In contrast to the
framework developed in [8], we extend the setting from one recipient to
multiple recipients to allow a mass mailing list distribution via e-mail. However, we can achieve a mailing list system that is resistant against phishing
by incorporating our multi-party ID-based chameleon hash function.
Roadmap
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the cryptographic tools and notions required throughout this paper. In Section 3, we
present our ID-based chameleon hash functions. In Section 4, we extend our
scheme to multi-party ID-based chameleon hash functions. We will also describe
the application of our schemes to mitigate phishing in this section. Section 5
concludes the paper.

2
2.1

Cryptographic Tools and Background
Basic Concepts of Bilinear Pairings

Let G1 , G2 be cyclic additive groups generated by P1 , P2 , respectively, whose
order are a prime q. Let GM be a cyclic multiplicative group with the same
order q. We assume there is an isomorphism ψ : G2 → G1 such that ψ(P2 ) = P1 .
Let e : G1 × G2 → GM be a bilinear mapping with the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q)ab for all P ∈ G1 , Q ∈ G2 , a, b, ∈ ZZq .
2. Non-degeneracy: There exists P ∈ G1 , Q ∈ G2 such that e(P, Q) 6= 1.
3. Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(P, Q) for all
P ∈ G1 , Q ∈ G2 .
For simplicity, hereafter, we set G1 = G2 and P1 = P2 . We note that our scheme
can be easily modified for a general case, when G1 6= G2 .
Bilinear pairing instance generator is defined as a probabilistic polynomial
time algorithm IG that takes as input a security parameter ` and returns a uniformly random tuple param = (p, G1 , GM , e, P ) of bilinear parameters, including
a prime number p of size `, a cyclic additive group G1 of order q, a multiplicative
group GM of order q, a bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → GM and a generator P of
G1 . For a group G of prime order, we denote the set G∗ = G \ {O} where O is
the identity element of the group.
2.2

Chameleon Hashing and ID-based Chameleon Hashing

Chameleon hashing (or trapdoor commitment) is basically non-interactive commitment schemes as proposed by Brassard, Chaum and Crepeau [3]. The idea
of chameleon hash functions was introduced and formalized in [7] in the construction of their chameleon signature schemes. The name “chameleon” refers to
the ability of the owner of the trapdoor information to change the input to the
function to any value of his choice without changing the resulting output.
A chameleon hash function is associated with a pair of public and private
keys and has the following properties [7]: (1) Anyone who knows the public
key can compute the associated hash function. (2) For people who do not have
the knowledge of the trapdoor (i.e. the secret key), the hash function is collision
resistant: it is infeasible to find two inputs which are mapped to the same output.
(3) The trapdoor information’s holder can easily find collisions for every given
input.
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Several constructions of chameleon hashing have been proposed in [7], which
are based on discrete log and [4], which is based on the hardness of deciding
whether an element is a “small” e-th residue modulo N 2 .
Unfortunately, it was shown in [6] that the family of chameleon hash functions
has some drawbacks that requires the willingness of the trapdoor to release this
information to show that the collision has happened. Therefore, this makes the
use of chameleon hash functions less practical. In [6, 2], the constructions of
chameleon hash functions without key exposure were proposed that make use
the technique of identity customization.
The idea of chameleon hashing has been extended in [1] to construct an
Identity-based chameleon hash. An ID-based chameleon hash scheme is defined
by a family of efficiently computable algorithms (Setup, Extract, Hash, Forge) as
follows.
– Setup: A probabilistic algorithm that is run by a trusted authority T A to
generate a pair of keys SK and PK defining the scheme. T A publishes PK
and keeps SK secret.
– Extract: A deterministic algorithm that accepts SK and an identity string
ID and outputs the trapdoor information T associated with the identity ID.
– Hash: A probabilistic algorithm that accepts PK, an identity string ID and
a message m to produce a hash value h.
– Forge: An algorithm that, on input PK, an identity string ID, the trapdoor
information T associated with ID, a message m0 , and a hash value h =
Hash(PK, ID, m0 ), outputs a sequence of random bits that correspond to a
valid computation of Hash(PK, ID, m0 ) yielding a collision on the same target
value h.
Related to this definition is the notion of collision forgery defined [1] as follows.
Definition 1. A collision forgery strategy is a probabilistic algorithm that given
identity string ID, a message m and random bits r, outputs another message
m0 and random bits r0 , where m 6= m0 and r 6= r0 , such that Hash(ID, m, r) =
Hash(ID, m0 , r0 ) with non-negligible probability.
A hashing scheme is said to be secure against existential collision forgery by
passive attacks if no collision-forgery strategy against it exists.
The semantic security for chameleon hashing scheme is defined as follows [1].
Definition 2. The chameleon hashing scheme is said to be semantically secure
if for all identity strings ID and all pairs of messages (m, m0 ), the probability distributions of the random variables Hash(ID, m, r) and Hash(ID, m0 , r0 ) are
computationally indistinguishable.
In [1], an ID-based chameleon hash function based on factorization is proposed. It is also shown an application of ID-based chameleon hash function for
a sealed-bid auction system.
(ID-based) chameleon hash functions have several applications, including the
most recent one proposed in [8] to mitigate phishing.
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3

New ID-based Chameleon Hash Function

In this section, we describe our new ID-based chameleon hash function that
does not incorporate identity-customization technique. The scheme is described
as follows.
 Setup: Private Key Generator (P KG) chooses a random number s ∈ Zq∗ as
master secret key and sets Ppub = sP ∈ G1 as master public key. Define
cryptographic hash functions H0 :{0, 1}∗ → G1 , h1 :{0, 1}∗ → Zq∗ . Let ê : G1
× G1 → GM be a pairing. P KG publishes { G1 , GM , ê, q, κ, p, Ppub , H0 ,
h1 } as system parameters SP and keeps s which is known only to itself.
 Extract: Each user submits his identity information ID to P KG. P KG outputs the user’s public key as QIDi = H0 (IDi ), and returns SIDi = s−1 QIDi
to the user as his private key.
 Hash: Given a message m, choose a random integer r ∈ Zq∗ , a set of identity
string ID, and let δ ∈ ZZ∗q donate an unique “event” (eg. the sender or
receiver’s information, or the date),
B = ê(P, δH0 (IDi ))
and
C = ê(Ppub , δH0 (IDi )),
r

r

computes (B , C ), outputs a hash value
h = Hash(m, δ, B r , C r )
= B h1 (m) C r
= ê(P, δH0 (IDi ))h1 (m) ê(Ppub , δH0 (IDi ))r
 Forge: For any valid hash value h, an algorithm F accepts inputs M P K, a
set of the corresponding trapdoor information ê(P, δSIDi ) associated with
identity string IDi , a message m0 , and a hash value h of a message m, B r
0
0
and C r , outputs B r and C r where
0

0

B r = B r ê(P, δSIDi )(h1 (m)−h1 (m ))
and

0

0

C r = C r B (h1 (m)−h1 (m )
Note that
0

0

0

Hash(m0 , δ, B r , C r ) = B h1 (m ) C r
0

0
0

= B h1 (m ) C r B (h1 (m)−h1 (m )
= Hash(m, δ, B r , C r )
0

0

and < B, C, B r , C r > is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple. Therefore, the forgery
is successful.
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Theorem 1. Our ID-based chameleon hash function is correct and secure.
Proof. The correctness of the hash function is obvious and therefore it is omitted.
For the security of the hash function, we will defer it for the moment and extend
this construction to multi-party setting in the next section, and provide the
proof.
Application. Using the framework developed in [8], our ID-based chameleon
hash function can be incorporated to mitigate phishing. We refer the reader to
[8] for a more complex treatment of the scheme.

4

Multi-party ID-based Chameleon Hash without Key
Exposure

In this section, we extend the ID-based chameleon hash function without key
exposure from a single recipient setting to a multiple recipient setting.
4.1

Model

Definition 3. A multi-party ID-based chameleon hashing scheme without key
exposure consists of four efficiently computable algorithms as following:
– Setup: Private Key Generator (P KG) takes as input a security parameter
λ and generates a pair of master secret key M SK and master public key
M P K.
– Extract: A deterministic algorithm that, on input M SK and an identity
string ID, outputs the trapdoor information SID corresponding to the identity.
– Hash: A probabilistic algorithm accepts M P K, a set of identity string ID,
a message m andPa random number r ∈ Zq∗ , and outputs a hashed value
n
h = Hash(M P K, i=1 IDi , m, r), and an event δ.
– Forge: For any valid hash value h, an algorithm F accepts inputs M P K, the
corresponding trapdoor information SID associated with ID, a message m0 ,
and a hash value h of a message m, and r, outputs r0 that satisfies
Hash(M P K,

n
X
i=1

IDi , m0 , r0 ) = Hash(M P K,

n
X

IDi , m, r)

i=1

The security of an multi-party ID-based chameleon hashing scheme without
key exposure is defined as follows:
Definition 4. Collision resistance: There exists no efficient algorithm that
accepts a message m, a random integer r, and another message m0 6= m as inputs,
and outputs a random integer r0 6= r that satisfy Hash(m0 , r0 ) = Hash(m, r), with
non-negligible probability unless with the knowledge of trapdoor information SID
associated with ID.
Definition 5. Semantic security: From the hash value it is infeasible to determine which message is likely to have resulted in such value by an application
of the hash algorithm.
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4.2

A Secure Scheme

In this section, we extend our scheme presented in Section 3 to the multi-party
setting.
– Setup: P KG chooses a random number s ∈ Zq∗ as master secret key and sets
Ppub = sP ∈ G1 as master public key. Define cryptographic hash functions
H0 :{0, 1}∗ → G1 , h1 :{0, 1}∗ → Zq∗ . Let ê : G1 × G1 → GM be a pairing.
P KG publishes { G1 , GM , ê, q, κ, p, Ppub , H0 , h1 } as system parameters
SP and keeps s which is known only to itself.
– Extract: Each user submits his identity information ID to P KG. P KG outputs the user’s public key as QIDi = H0 (IDi ), and returns SIDi = s−1 QIDi
to the user as his private key.
∗
– Hash: Given a message m, choose a random integer r ∈ Z
Pqn, a set of identity
string ID, andP
let δ donate an unique event, B = ê(P, δ i=1 H0 (IDi )) and
n
C = ê(Ppub , δ i=1 H0 (IDi )), computes (B r , C r ), outputs a hash value
h = Hash(m, δ, B r , C r )
= B h1 (m) C r
n
n
X
X
= ê(P, δ
H0 (IDi ))h1 (m) ê(Ppub , δ
H0 (IDi ))r
i=1

i=1

– Forge: For any valid hash value h, an algorithm F accepts inputs M P K, a
set of the corresponding trapdoor information ê(P, δSIDi ) associated with
identity string IDi , a message m0 , and a hash value h of a message m, B r
0
0
and C r , outputs B r and C r where
0

B r = B r ê(P, δ

n
X

0

SIDi )(h1 (m)−h1 (m ))

i=1

and

0

0

C r = C r B (h1 (m)−h1 (m )
Note that
0

0

0

Hash(m0 , δ, B r , C r ) = B h1 (m ) C r
0

0
0

= B h1 (m ) C r B (h1 (m)−h1 (m )
= Hash(m, δ, B r , C r )
0

0

and < B, C, B r , C r > is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple. Therefore, the forgery
is successful.
4.3

Security Analysis

Theorem 2. Our ID-based chameleon hashing scheme is resistant to collision
forgery provided that the discrete log problem in GM is intractable.
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Proof. Given a collision,
Hash(m, δ,

n
X

r

0

r

H0 (IDi ), B , C ) = Hash(m , δ,

i=1

n
X

0

0

H0 (IDi ), B r , C r ),

i=1

i.e.,
0

B h1 (m) C r = B h1 (m ) C r
where
B = ê(P, δ

n
X

H0 (IDi )),

0

C = ê(Ppub , δ

i=1
0

B r = B r ê(P, δ

n
X

n
X

H0 (IDi )),

i=1
0

SIDi )(h1 (m)−h1 (m )) ,

0

0

C r = C r B (h1 (m)−h1 (m ) ,

i=1

we easily deduce
0

B r /B r = ê(P, δ

n
X

0

SIDi )(h1 (m)−h1 (m ))

i=1

= ê(P, δ

n
X

QIDi )s

−1

(h1 (m)−h1 (m0 ))

.

i=1

We note that it is equivalent to solve the discrete log problem in GM based
on M OV reduction. Hence, only the owners of the trapdoor information can
generate collision forgery.
Theorem 3. The Multi-party ID-based chameleon hashing scheme without key
exposure is semantically secure.
Proof. The multi-party ID-based chameleon hashing scheme without key exposure is said to be semantically secure if, for all identity strings ID, and all pairs
of messages m and m0 , the probability distributions of the random variables
0
0
Hash(m, IDi∈(1...n) , B r , C r ) and Hash(m0 , IDi∈(1...n) , B r , C r ) are computationally indistinguishable, i.e., given m, m0 , z = Hash(m, IDi∈(1...n) , B r , C r ) and
0
0
z 0 = Hash(m0 , IDi∈(1...n) , B r , C r ), an adversary cannot distinguish in polyno0
mial time between (z, z ) of any pair of messages m and m0 . The proposed hashing schemes satisfies the semantic security. This is because given a hash value z,
any identity string ID and any message m, there is exactly one random element
r ∈ Zq∗ and exactly one pair (B r , C r ), such that Hash(m, IDi∈(1...n) , B r , C r )
equals z (Because of the non-degeneracy of bilinear pairing). Due to the randomness of r, the semantic security follows.
Theorem 4. The multi-party ID-based chameleon hashing scheme is secure against
revealing the trapdoor information if collision forgery happened.
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Proof. Collision forgery will result in the signer recovering the information
ê(P, δ

n
X

SIDi )

i=1

as following equation
0

B r /B r = ê(P, δ

n
X

0

SIDi )(h1 (m)−h1 (m ))

i=1

= ê(P, δ

n
X

QIDi )s

−1

(h1 (m)−h1 (m0 ))

.

i=1

Pn
However, the signer could not recover the sum of the set of secret key i=1 SIDi
or any set of the trapdoor information. Hence, all receivers can still surely use
their secret keys at anytime and anywhere after submit hash collision to judge.

Theorem 5. The multi-party ID-based chameleon hashing scheme is secure against
that signer to compute hash collision after collision forgery if he re-uses the hash
function for other transactions with the same recipients.
Proof. Define δ to denote an unique transaction event. As Theorem 4, collision
forgery will result in the signer recovering the information
ê(P, δ

n
X

SIDi )

i=1

as following equation
0

B r /B r = ê(P, δ

n
X

0

SIDi )(h1 (m)−h1 (m ))

i=1

However, δ changes on each transaction. Since collision information
ê(P, δ

n
X

SIDi )

i=1

Pn
changes on each transaction as well, signer can not use B r and ê(P, δ i=1 SIDi )
0
to compute a B r for other transaction with the same recipients to judge. Hence,
the multi-party ID-based chameleon hashing scheme is resistant to signer to deny
his signature to judge.
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4.4

Application: Multi-party Deniable Authentication to Mitigate
Phishing

In this section, we describe a construction of multi-party deniable authentication
ID-based signature schemes that generalizes [8], which is used to mitigate phishing. This construction is based on the Multi-party ID-based chameleon hash
scheme without key exposure described earlier. There are n recipients in our deniable authentication schemes, and they have their identities ID published. We
note that any verifier cannot convince any other third party about the authenticity of the message because verifiers can always forge collision by themselves. We
also note that any verifier believes that signature is indeed generated by signer
instead of any member of the verifier group because they do not forge the message and only the signer can generate the signature. Our multi-party ID-based
signature schemes can be used in anti-phishing broadcast email system in practice since these deniable authentication schemes do not require the unrelialistic
adoption of a Public Key Infrastructure, meanwhile, guarantee the email come
from as it claimed which can prevent from the email from field spoofing, and the
chameleon hash functions provide repudiability. The construction is defined as
follows.
Model
There exist a sender, Alice, and i receivers Ri , where i ∈ {1..n}, in the
system. We assume that all of participants have setup their public key setting,
and we donate SIDs , QIDs as a pair of secret key and public for sender, SIDi ,
QIDi as a pair of secret key and public key for receiver Ri , where i ∈ {1...n}. A
multi-party ID-Based signature scheme with deniable authentication consists of
four efficiently computable algorithms:
– Multi-party ID-Based Chameleon Hash without Key Exposure CH: A trapdoor one-way hash function that uses the set of each receiver’s ID, a message
m and a random number r to generate a hash value over message m.
– Multi-party ID-Based Chameleon Forge without Key Exposure CF: receivers
can find collisions of the chameleon hash function such that a different message m0 and a different random number r0 would pass the signature verification procedure.
– Signature Generation SG: A deterministic algorithm that uses the signer’s
secret key, and the Multi-party ID-Based chameleon hash without key exposure of m under the identities of the intended recipients to generate a
signature σ ← IDSign(SIDs , h)
– Signature Verification SV: A deterministic algorithm that receives a message
m, a signature σ, and a sender’s identity IDs , that returns True if the signature is correct, or ⊥ otherwise. That is, {T rue, ⊥} ← IDV erity(IDs , m, σ)
In addition to the above main algorithms, we also require the following,
 Correctness. All signatures that are generated correctly by IDSign
algorithm, will always pass the verification algorithm. That is,
P r(T rue ← IDV erif y(IDs , m, IDSign(SIDs , h)) = 1
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 Multi-party Chameleon Hash without Key Exposure Collisions
Generation. We require that the receivers can always produce collisions
from the original message.
Our Scheme
We now present our concrete construction of a multi-party ID-Based signature
scheme with Deniable Authentication. We incorporate the signature scheme due
to Cha-Cheon [5].
– Setup: P KG generates and publishes global system params (G1 , G2 , ê, q, κ,
p, Ppub , H0 , h1 ). Choose a random number s ∈ Zq∗ as master secret key, keep
s known by itself, and sets Ppub = sP as master public key.
– Extract: Sender submits his identity information IDs to P KG, and P KG
computes his public key as QIDs = H0 (IDs ) and returns his secret key
SIDs = s−1 QIDs to the sender via a private channel. So does receiver. P KG
generates the secret key SIDi =s−1 QIDi for each receiver with identity public
key QIDi =H0 (IDi ), i ∈ 1, ..., n.
∗
– CH: Given a message m, choose a random integer r ∈ ZP
q , a set of identity
n
string ID, andP
let δ donate an unique event, B = ê(P, δ i=1 H0 (IDi )) and
n
C = ê(Ppub , δ i=1 H0 (IDi )), computes (B r , C r ), outputs a hash value
 M̃ = Hash(m, δ, B r , C r )
= B h1 (m)P
Cr
Pn
n
= ê(P, δ i=1 H0 (IDi ))h1 (m) ê(Ppub , δ i=1 H0 (IDi ))r .
– SG: Given a chameleon hashed message M̃ , computes
 h = h1 (M̃ ) ∈ Zq∗
 V = hSIDs + rQ ∈ G1 , A = rP .
The message-signature pair is σ ← {m, V, B r , C r , δ, A} which is broadcast
to all receivers.
– SV: To verify the signature, any receiver computes
 M̃ = Hash(m, δ, B r , C r )
= B h1 (m)P
Cr
Pn
n
= ê(P, δ i=1 H0 (IDi ))h1 (m) ê(Ppub , δ i=1 H0 (IDi ))r .
 h = h1 (M̃ ) ∈ Zq∗
Test if ê(P, V ) = ê(Ppub , hQIDs )ê(A, Q) holds with equality. If so, then output True. Otherwise, output ⊥.
Security Analysis
Theorem 6. The proposed multi-party ID-Based signature scheme with deniable authentication satisfies the properties of non-transferability, non-repudiation,
unforgeability, key exposure free and non-interaction.
Proof.
– Non-transferability: Note that receivers can find a message different from
m which would pass the signature verification procedure using the forge
algorithm, thus, the message is in question. Therefore, any recipient cannot
transfer a signature of the signer to convince any third party.

AusCERT2007 R&D Stream

11

– Non-repudiation: Given a valid signature, the signer cannot generate a valid
hash collision which satisfies the chameleon hash function and m 6= m0 . And
the signature cannot be repudiated because it is equivalent to solving the
discrete log problem in GM .
– Unforgeability: For any third party, this ID-based chameleon signature scheme
is based on the security of Cha-Cheon’s [5] ID-based signature scheme, which
also is secure even under the adaptive chosen-message attacks, and our IDbased chameleon hash function.
0
0
– Without key exposure:
a collision (m, B r , C r ) and (m, B r , C r ), the
PGiven
n
information of ê(P, δ i=1 SIDi ) can be recovered.
However, it is impossiPn
ble for anyone to compute SIDi from ê(P, δ i=1 SIDi ). Therefore, collision
forgery cannot result in the signer recovering the recipient trapdoor information SIDi , which means that the secret key of the recipient group can be
reused after collision happened.
– Non-Interaction: The verifier does not need to have his public key setup
before receiving a message that is signed with a deniable ID-based signature
scheme. The signer is only required to contact P KG if the verifier wants to
forge a signature.

5

Conclusion

In this paper, we presented a novel way to construct ID-based chameleon hash
functions. In contrast to the previous constructions, our scheme does not require
any identity customization, which is the first in the literature. We presented a
new ID-based chameleon hash function, and extended the scheme to multi-party
ID-based chameleon hash function. Finally, we presented a scheme to mitigate
phishing as an application.
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